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NOTES

AND

COMMENT

RES JUDICATA AS BETWEEN JOINT TORT-FRAsRs-In Snyder V.
Marken, a negligence action between automobile owners growing out
of a collision which resulted in injuries to a third person as well as
to the plaintiffs, a judgment in the action by the third person was held
unavailable as a defense, upon the ground that parties to a judgment
are not bound by it in subsequent controversies between each other
unless they were adversaries in the other action wherein the judgment
was entered, that is, unless there were issues as between the co-defendants in that action.
The judgment held not res iudicata in the Snyder case, supra, was
in favor of the defendants, but had it been against the defendants or
in favor of one and against the other of them, the reason underlying
that decision would have called for the same disposition of a defense
of res iudicata. It is the nature of the issues in the former action,
not the result of that action, which determines whether or not the
defendants were adversaries.
1116 Wash. 270 and 700, 199 Pac. 302, 22 A. L. R. 1272 (1921).
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Res judicata in liability-over actions may involve considerations in
addition to the nature of the issues in the former action.
Tort-feasors may be divided into two classes; those who are guilty
of negligent actions or omissions in person, and those who sustain such
a relationship to others that they are liable as a matter of law for the
negligent acts or omissions of such others. Of the latter class are
principals and masters. 2 One who is liable for the negligence of another may have been guilty, of course, of acts or omissions constituting
independent negligence, in which event he would be of both classes.
Where liability exists only as a result of negligence of another, there
may be a recovery over against him upon payment of a judgment m
favor of the third person. In that event, the parties to the liabilityover action are not deemed joint tort-feasors as between themselves;
they sustain the relation of indemnitor and indemnitee. 3 It is otherwise where the plaintiff in the liability-over action was
guilty of inde4
pendent negligence, and recovery-over cannot be had.
It may be observed, in passing, that there is some confusion in the
decisions as to what constitutes independent negligence, due to treating
a duty, non-delegable as between the third person and the defendant
in the original action, as non-delegable so far as the parties to the
liability-over action are concerned, or, due to treating a single duty as
owing to the third person by both parties to the liability-over action,5
which amounts to the same thing. Where performance of the duty
owing the first person has been delegated to the defendant in the liabilityover action, the plaintiff is not guilty of independent negligence precluding recovering from the defendant, unless the plaintiff had actual
knowledge that the defendant was not performing that duty.
The rights of the parties to the liability-over action, as between
themselves, may or may not be in issue in the original action. They
seldom are. Needless to say, where they are not in issue, the judgment
cannot affect such rights. However, where the relationship of the
parties to the liability-over action is such that the defendant is liable
over to the plaintiff, the latter may bind the former as to matters
adjudicated in the original action by giving him notice that he will
be looked to for indemnity in the event of an adverse judgment and
by tendering him the defense of the action. 6
2 Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 710, 63 Pac. 572 (1901)
Morris v. Northwestern Imp. Co., 53 Wash. 451, 102 Pao. 402 (1909) Armack v. Great
Northern R. Co., 126 Wash. 533, 219 Pac. 52 (1923).
sDoremus v. Root, supra, Alaska Steamship Co. v. Pacific Coast G.
Co., 71 Wash. 359, 128 Pac. 654 (1912) Snyder v. Marken, note 1, supra.
ITacoma v. Bonne l, 65 Wash. 505, 118 Pac. 642 (1911) Alaska Steamship Co. v. Pacific Coast G. Co., note 3, supra, Seattle v. Shorrock,
100 Wash. 234, 170 Pac. 590 (1918) Seattle v. Great Northern R. Co., 103
Wash. 294, 174 Pac. 4 (1918)
5
Alaska Pacific Steamship Co. v. Sperry Flour Co., 122 Wash. 642,
211 Pac. 761 (1922)'.
6 22 Cyc. 99" 14 R. C. L. 62-63.

NOTES AND COMMENT
In Seattle v. Peterson & Co., and Seattle v. Erckson,8 judgments
were held res judicata without mentioning notice or opportunity to
defend the original action. There may have been such notice and
opportunity, and through inadvertence the fact was not referred to in
the opinion. There the plaintiffs were held bound by the judgments
upon the theory that they were founded on independent negligence and,
therefore, the plaintiffs were estopped by the judgments. If the defendants had notice and opportunity to defend, they were correctly
decided, otherwise they were not, for the reason that an estoppel by
judgment must be mutual, a judgment is binding upon both parties
or upon neither.' If the judgments were not binding on the defendants, which they would not be m the absence of such notice and opportunity, then the plaintiffs were not properly held bound thereby.
In Alaska Pacific Steamship Co. v. Sperry Flour Co.,' ° a judgment
of dismissal entered upon the granting of a nonsuit in favor of the
flour company for insufficiency of the evidence of negligence on its
part was unsuccessfully interposed as a defense, the court basing its
decision upon the adversaries rule applied in the Snyder case. To that
extent the decision is obviously sound.
However, the court also held that upon re-trial the judgment m
the original action should be binding upon the steamship company in
four specific particulars directly in issue in that action. The decision
on that point is unsound, for the reason that the flour company had
neither notice nor actual knowledge that it would be looked to for
indemnity in the event of judgment against the steamship company
and had no opportunity to conduct the steamship company's defense,
which affirmatively appears from the opinion. It is stated therein
that the steamship company, the respondent, "did not at any time in
that action give notice to appellant that it claimed that appellant was
liable over to it, and did not tender to appellant the defense of that
action, as is customary in cases where liability-over is thought to exist."
As the flour company was not a party to and, hence, not bound by
the judgment, the steamship company should have been held not bound
by it in the particulars named or any other particular. The cases
cited by the court in support of its holding in that respect go to the
question of form of the notice, the form being held immaterial so long
as the party against whom recovery-over was sought knew that the
party held liable in the original action would look to him for indemnity.
The defendant in the steamship company case did not have such
knowledge and, furthermore, was not given an opportunity to take
over the steamship company's defense.
In the Alaska Steamship Co. case, supra, the court overruled Seattle
V. Erickson, supra, for the reason, apparently, that the defendant was
199 Wash. 533, 170 Pac. 140 (1918).

8 99 Wash. 543, 169 Pac. 185 (1918).
'Bennett v. General Ace. & Assur. Co., 213 Mo. App. 421, 255
S. W 1076 (1923) McCarthy v. W . H. Wood Lumber Co., 219 Mass. 566,
107 N. E. 439 (1914) 15 R. C. L. 956; 21 C. J. 1067.
"107 Wash. 545, 182 Pac. 634, 185 Pac. 583 (1919).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
dismissed out of the case on motion for nonsuit and, therefore, was
not an adversary of the plaintiff. It is an interesting fact that the
Erickson case, supra, was decided on the same day as Seattle v. Peterson

& Co., supra, January 17, 1918, and no mention is made of the latter
in the case overruling the former. Nor has the Peterson & Co. case
been at any time the subject of comment. They cannot be distinguished
in principle, since one who is not a party to an action is no more an
adversary of a defendant than one who is dismissed out of an action
on the granting of a nonsuit.
In Puyallup v. Vergowe," distinguished in the Alaska Steamship Co.

case, supra, on the proposition of independent negligence, the judgment
was considered binding on the plaintiff in the liability-over action for
the reason that it was held in the original action to be guilty of an
independent act of negligence. But the opinion makes it clear that
the defendant in the subsequent action had knowledge of the fact that
the city looked to him for indemnity An opportunity to defend, no
doubt, was given the defendant.
To summarize. In cases where the defendant in the liability-over
action was given notice or knew that he would be looked to for the
other's loss and had an opportunity to defend for the other, he is in
legal effect a party to the original action and, hence, the matters properly adjudicated1" are binding as between the parties to the subsequent
action. Where independent negligence has been adjudicated, under such
circumstances, the judgment precludes recovery-over. Of that class

of decisions are also Tacoma v. Bonnell" and Seattle v. Shorrock. 4

Where the defendant in the liability-over action was not actually, or
in legal effect as a result of notice or knowledge and opportunity to
defend, a party to the judgment in the original action, it is not binding
on either party, or even admissible in evidence.
In each of the liability-over cases above mentioned, the defendant
was either not a party to the original action or was dismissed out of
the case for insufficiency of the evidence to establish negligence on his
part. Had the defendant in the liability-over action been a party to
the original action and had judgment gone against both defendants
in that action, or had a judgment, affirmatively establishing no negligence, been entered in favor of the defendant who was thereafter
made a party defendant to the liability-over action, the result would
not have been different.
The fact that the judgment in the original action was favorable to
the one later made defendant in the liability-over action should not
make the result different than had a nonsuit been granted him. The
plaintiff in the original action would have "controlled the introduction
of the evidence" as in the nonsuit case, unless there were issues which
permitted the defendants to introduce evidence as to their rights and
liabilities as between themselves, and the adversaries rule applied in
195 Wash. 320, 163 Pac. 779 (1917).
1" Seattle v. Shorrock, note 4, supra.
"1Note 4, supra.
1" Note 4, supra.

RECENT CASES
the Alaska Pacific Steamship Co. case, supra, consequently, would be
applied. If not adversaries within that rule, whether or not the judgment should be held res iudicata would turn on notice given the
other party or knowledge by him that he would be looked to for
indemnity, and his opportunity to defend.
The adversaries rule and the rule requiring notice and opportunity
to control the other party's defense should apply also where judgment
goes against both parties. If the defendants in the original action
were treated as adversaries and they were given a free reign in introducing evidence as to their differences, both would be bound under
the adversaries rule; "' otherwise, the judgment could be made binding,
as to matters actually adjudicated, only by notice and opportunity to
defend.
The controlling principles are well settled, but there is some confusion. Such confusion as exists has resulted from failure of the courts
to keep in mind the adversaries rule, that a judgment is binding on
both parties or neither, or that a judgment is not binding in the
liability-over action where the defendant had no knowledge that indemnity would be expected of him or had no opportunity to defend.
GEORGE D. LANTZ.

RECENT CASES
CONTRACTS-RESTRAImT OF TRADE.-Plaintiffs purchased defendant's
stock in a company which operated a fleet of sight-seeing vehicles in
Seattle. The defendant orally promised and agreed not to engage in similar employment and solicitation of tourist business for any competing
company or hunself in the city of Seattle. Thereafter, defendant assisted
in organizing a competing company in Seattle and became active in solicitIng the patronage of tourists in that city. Held: That such a contract
limited as to space but unlimited as to time, is valid, and plaintiff is
entitled to an injunction. Barasi v. Johnson, 42 Wash. Dec. 64, 252 Pac.
680 (1927).
Such contracts are valid only when restricted as to time and to place,
and when reasonably necessary to the protection of the party in whose
interest they are made. Conversely stated, such contracts when without
limit as to time or place are invalid. Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. SwanLong V.
son, 76 Wash. 649, 137 Pac. 144, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 522 (1913)
Towl, 42 Mo. 545, 97 Am. Dec. 355 (1868).
Under the early English law, any voluntary restraint by contract by
an individual upon his right to carry on his trade or calling was void as
against public policy. Dyer's Case, Y. B. 2 Hen. V p. 5, pl. 26 (1415) Ipswhic
Tailor's Case, 11 'Coke 59a, 77 Reprint 1218. But under the modern English doctrine a covenant not to engage in a particular business limited to
twenty-five years in time and wholly unlimited in space, is valid if it is
coupled with a sale of the business and is necessary to protect the purchaser in what he has bought. Nordenfeldt v. Maxim Vordenfeldt Gun &
Ammunition Co., 63 L. J. Ch. 908 (1894), App. Cas. 535, 11 R. 1, 71 L. T.
489, 6 E. R. C. 413. In the United States, the courts have regarded a contract unlimited in both time and space as a total restraint of trade, and
void. Roberts v. Lemont, 73 Neb. 365, 102 N. W 770 (1905). And if the
=15 R. C. L. 1013-1014.

